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F 0 R
R E L E AS E
REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
at t he
UNIVERSITY OF MAINE CONVOCATION
MEMORIAL GYMNASIUM
Sunday, February 11,

1968

8:00 p.m. , e. s. t.

VIET NAM

My remarks, today, deal with Viet Nam.

Before

proceeding to them, however, I wish to refer to the USS Pueblo
incident.

When added to the Vietnamese conflict, it is illustra-

tive of the hydra-headed character of military involvement on
the mainland of Asia.

War spreads readily on that continent;

the difficulty lies in curbing it.

I would emphasize, therefore,

that while the urgency in Viet Nam is to bring one bloody conflict
to a close, the imperative in Korea is to prevent the opening
of another.
In the latter connection, it will help to bear in
mind the essent i als of the Pueblo affair.

A U. S. vessel--that

it was an electronic listener of some sort is not disputed--was
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in a position off the North Korean coast.

What vital national

need prompted the dispatch of this particular mission or why the
vessel went undefended are not known.
All reports available to me indicate that the
Pueblo was in international waters at the time it was taken.
As of the moment, the Pueblo is now at anchor in Wonsan harbor
and the 82 surviving crewmen who were aboard--one other has
died--are interned in North Korea.

That ineluctable fact is

in no way altered by a sense of outrage or indignation.
The crew aboard the Pueblo was carrying out a
dangerous assignment.

The "why" and the ''how" of the mission

are moot at thts point.
those men.

What matters now is the obligation to

In our reactions to the Pueblo affair, lives must

not become the pawns of either pride or petulance .

Every effort

to bring about their release must be made.
We will also do well to bear in mind that the one
war in which we are engaged on the Asian mainland has become a
source of immense grief .

Any move which leads into a second
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Vietnamese-type conflict in Korea will compound the grief but
hardly serve the interests of this nation.
In sum, what most matters at this point, it seems
to me, is:

(1)

return of the 80-odd American crewmen· alive--

I repeat, alive--and; (2) prevention of a second war in Korea
on the pattern of Viet Nam which could the more readily become
World War III.
The firm restraint which President Johnson has
exercised from the outset of the Pueblo affair has set a wise
course for this nation.

The question has been raised at the

United Nations Security Council by Ambassador Arthur Goldberg.
It has been pursued at the Panmunjom truce site in discussions
between our representatives and those of North Xorea . ·· Other
channels are also being tapped which might lead to the release
of the crewmen.

In short, the President's policy at this time

is to seek a solution by diplomacy.

It is the course of prudence

and reason in what is, at best, a delicate and aangerous
tion.

It deserves every support of the nation.

situa~

- 4 There is no certainty that the present efforts
will bear fruit.
available.

Other possibilities, however, may also be

I would point out, for example, that, if necessary,

the matter should be pressed further at the United Nations which
has had a definite responsibility in Korea for almost two decades
If it comes to that, it may be feasible to seek impartial arbitration or mediation or a presentation of the entire matter to
the World Court.

May I say that precedent for the latter proce-

dure is to be found in a similar dispute two decades ago over
the loss of two Bri tish destroyers off the Albanian Coast.
Whatever the specific recourse, in my judgment,
the efforts to find a peaceful solution in the Pueblo affair
are attuned to this nation's i nterest.

What matters in my

judgment i s saving lives, not savi ng face.

What matters is

the substance not the shadow of this nat ion's i nterests.
That is true in Korea; and it is no less true in
VietNam.

The nation's interests in VietNam, in my judgment,

lie in bringing the war to an honorable conclusion at the

- 5 earliest possible moment.

The pursujt of a negotiated solution

was right for this nation before the recent coordinated offensives in the South Vietnamese cities.

It is right today, while

that offensive continues in certain areas and when a second
offensive may be on the verge of opening, if not in Khe Sanh,
somewhere else in the remote highlands of central Viet Nam.
Insofar as I can see, negotiations are and have
always been the only rational alternative in this situation to
an indefinite U. S. involvement on the Southeast Asian mai nland.
Two years ago I joined four Senate colleagues, including Senator
Muskie, in a report at the cJnclusion of a visit to Southeast
Asia.

Our princ i pal observation, then, was that the American

pos i tion in Viet Nam had the character of "pressing against a
military situation which is, in effect, open- ended . "

We added

this comment:"How open i s dependent on the extent to which North
Viet Nam and its suppo rters are willing and able to meet
increased force by increased force ."

:.ncre~~~

It is more apparent now

than it was at the time that the war is open-ended .

How open

- 6 may be uncertain--in my judgment it is still wide open--but in
any event, to date, the NLF and the North Vietnamese have been
both able and willing to meet increased force with increased
force.
At the beginning of 1966, the United States alreadJ
had 180,000 men in Viet Nam.

American forces directly involved

in the war have since tri pled to somethi ng approaching 600,000-with over 500,000 on the ground i n Viet Nam and the others servi ng the war from elsewhere i n the region.
ties have gone well past 100,000.

To tal American casual-

Last year's t oll o f those

/

k i lled i n act i on showed a seveti fold i ncrease i n two years, from
1,964 i n 1965 to 9,353 i n 1967.
This increase i n the American military effort has
been met by i ncreases i n the North Vietnamese-NLF effort ; their
casualties, t oo, have increased greatly.

The war, in short,

has risen over the past three years to ever higher i ntensities
of destructiveness.

The bas i c juxtaposition in Viet Nam, however

- 7 has not been altered as anticipated.

In the spring of 1965, the

all-consuming objective of the American effort was to prevent
the collapse of a government with which we had allied ourselves .
Almost three years later, countless thousands of lives later,
and tens of billions of dollars later, that is still the
objective.
One can put whatever interpretation one chooses
on the recent events in Viet Nam.

To me, however, they suggest

that the survival of the Saigon political structure, in its
present form, may now be more uncertain.

The pacification

program appears to have gone the route of at least a dozen prior
schemes for "winning the people" by providi ng them with security
and a stake i n the structure.

The cities of South Viet Nam

which have heretofore been spared most of the ravages of the war,
almost by tacit understanding, have now been drawn into the
vortex of its terrible devastation.

If there is an alternative

to chaos in what has heretofore been the core of the government's
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strength, it will lie in yet another costly task of reconstruction and rehabilitation whjch can hardly be borne by the South
Vietnamese government.
What is now clear is that no part of South Viet
Nam is secure for anyone.

The hamlets, villages, and the cities

of Viet Nam are seen to be honeycombed with a NLF infrastructure
which has undoubtedly existed for many years, which is still
intact and which may well be

str~nger

than ever.

It is possible to point to one-sided casualty
figures and to echo one-sjded words of reassurance.

If we are

interested in saving lives rather than saving face, however, I
think we will find the realjsm to confront the implications of
the present situation.

The Saigon political structure is no

stronger today than it was three years ago in the sense of being
able on its own to govern, to defend or to rally the people of
South Viet Nam.

Indeed, its very survival now appears more

dependent upon American military power than at any time in the

- 9 past.

In short, once again there is not the beginnings of a

beginning of a stable political situation in South Viet Nam.
That such i s the case, in no way reflects on the
courage or the competence of the military forces which have
carried the burden of combat in Viet Nam for many months.

In

statistical terms, these forces have been immensely effective.
They have won major engagement after engagement.

The figures

say that over 87,000 enemy troops were killed last year, that
another 27,000 have crossed over to the government side and that
countless thousands were captured or were otherwise put out of
action.

Naval and air power have pounded so much of North Viet

Nam into rubble that there are left unscathed scarcely any
military or i ndustri al targets.
Nevertheless, for the k i nd of war which is be i ng
fought in South Viet Nam, the forces in oppo s i tion continue to
obtai n adequate and, apparently, ever more sophisticated military supplies over the i nfiltration routes from the North.

The
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NLF remains omnipresent, from the demilitarized zone at the
17th parallel to the Mekong Delta and its regular forces and
guerillas are steeled to accept great privation and to make
enormous sacrifices.

The Viet Cong remain entrenched and vir-

tually untouched in their traditional strongholds--the swamps,
paddy-fields and hamlets of the Mekong Delta--from whence they
are now seen to be able to dispatch forces to Saigon and other
cities.

North Viet Nam has committed to the war in the South

considerably less than a quarter of the well-trained forces of
General Giap.

And beyond North Viet Nam lies the untapped

manpower of China and the supply sources of both China and the
Soviet Union.
These are some of the realities whj_ch the computers of

11

progress 11 in this war do not measure.

These are

some of the realities which urge us to recall the original
purposes for which the nation was committed to South Viet Nam.
They were, above all, limited purposes.

We went into Viet Nam

not to take over a war but on the assumption that we were
summon~a

to aid the people of South Viet Nam.
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From the outset, it was not an American responsibility and it is not now an American responsibility to win a
victory for any particular Vietnamese group, or to defeat any
particular Vietnamese group.

It was not then and it is not now

an American function to insure that any political structure
shall be enshrined over the smoldering ruins of a devastated
Viet Nam.

Even if we could, we should not seek to synthesize

a government or system for South Viet Nam.

That is not the

responsibility of the American military command, the American
economists and the American political scientists who are
gathered in Saigon.

That is a responsibility which can only

be exercised by the Vietnamese people themselves.

The sooner

that the limits of our commitment are recognized by all
directly concerned, therefore, the better for all concerned.
We need to face the probability, bluntly, that
the build-up of the Ameri can i nvolvement, in its very
immensity, may well have already extended the role of this
nation beyond those l imits.

In so doing, it may not be aidi ng--
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as it was intended--to resolve the situation in accord with the
wishes of the

pe~ple

of South Viet Nam.

It is apparent, for

example, that the more that U. S. forces have taken the major
combat role, the slacker have been the efforts of the allied
indigenous forces.

It is apparent, too, that a massive U. S.

technological presence in South Viet Nam has exerted a revolutionary impact on the whole of the fabric of traditional
Vietnamese society.
In a physical sense, the crushing weight of
modern warfare has fallen not only on the Viet Cong--the NLF-and the North Vietnamese but on all Vietnamese.

The terrible

cost in lives and property throughout Viet Nam is borne by
Vietnamese of all poljtical colors.
Our immense effort, in short, has gone a long way
in altering the character of what was once an inner struggle
among Vietnamese.

In the end, however, the future of Viet Nam

must depend on the Vietnamese themselves.

It is their country;

- 13 they live j_n it.

They will be living in it long after we are

gone from it.
Our commitment is to support, not to submerge.
To strip the Vietnamese struggle of its Vietnamese character,
to convert it into a war to be won or lost by this nation,
detracts from its relevance both to the people of Viet Nam and
to the people of the United States.

To do so is to consolidate

an American involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland of i ndefinite duration and obscure purpose whose terminus is not
visible--not in Viet Nam, not in Laos, or in Cambodia.

Indeed,

i t may well be an involvement whi ch is without exit except in
World War III.
This nation is deeply committed in South Viet Nam
but let us not make the mistake of interpreting that commitment
as compelling us--in the name of victory or whatever--to see to
it that every last member of the NLF is either dulled, dead, or
fleeing to the North, and that North Viet Nam has been bombed
back into the Stone Age.

That course leads not to an ending but

- 14 to an endless successj.on of vjolent beginnings.

An interminable

involvement of American forces may meet the desires of some in
Viet Nam or of some other nation, but that course does not
accord with the substance of the interests of the United States.
President Johnson has repeatedly stated that this
nation's objective is

11

•••

only that the people of South VietNam

be allowed to gui de their own country in their own way.
has stated that he is w5lling to move at any time in

11

He

negotiation~

which might bring about that result.
It should be made clear to all concerned--Americans and Vietnamese--that that is the extent of this nation's
commitment.
Viet Nam.

The commitment is to all of the people of South
We have no obligation to continue to pour out the

blood and resources of this nation until South Viet Nam is
made safe for one faction or another .
Indeed, in my judgment, there is little prospect
of meeting our actual commitment to the people of Viet Nam in
the visible future unless there is a prompt restoration of
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On that basis, every avenue--in the United Nations or

elsewhere--should continue to be explored in an effort to reach
an honorable conclusion.

In so doing, this nation needs no

sanction or approval from any group, leader, or whomever in
Viet Nam or anywhere else.
In the hope of bringing about a peaceful settlement without adding to the burdens of the American forces in
the south, I have joined Senator Cooper and others in urging
that the bombing of North Viet Nam be restricted to the infiltration routes at the 17th parallel.

I am frank to say, however .

that while it may well result in negotiations, I am not at all
sure that a cessation of the bombing is the critical factor in
bringing this war to an honorable conclusion.

More important,

in my judgment, is the framework in which the war in Viet Nam
is seen and within which its conclusion is negotiated.

It is

doubtful that there is a basis for fruitful negotiations if
the conflict is defined as a simple case of aggression on the
part of the North against the South.

The reality is far more

- 16 complex, far more subtle.

That is true insofar as the relation-

ship between North and South Viet Nam is concerned.

It is true

insofar as the relationship of the various groups and elements
within SouthViet Nam is concerned.

The government in Saigon,

as it is presently constituted continues to be run by a faction
of military officers--indeed, most of whom are northerners-and they are by no means the whole political coin.

There are

other gr0ups of southern Vietnamese who must be taken more into
consideration if there is to be an end to the bloodshed in the
foreseeable future.

These groups include not only those within

the Nat i onal Liberation Front but elements wh ch are now without
significant voice in either camp.
A negotiated solution, if there i s to be one, may
well involve preliminary discussions among the political, religous, and sectarian groups, as well as the ruling military group,
which are to be found under the Saigon structure.

If there can

be some common agreement among them to seek a settlement of the
war, it is at least conceivable that there could then be

- 17 discussions with the National Liberation Front.

Needless to

say, such discussions can hardly take place if the Saigon government regards even words of compromise as treasonable.
If the door could be opened to peace-talks among
the South Vietnamese themselves, one would hope that it would
make easier the opening of doors to negotiat i_ons between this
nation and North Viet Nam and among all the nations directly or
indirectly concerned in the conflict.

A basis might then be

laid for applying the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 in determining the future relationship of the two parts of Viet Nam and
for guaranteeing the neutralization of Viet Nam and all of IndoChina.

May I add it does not much matter whether such discus-

sions are held under United Nations auspices or in Geneva, or
in some other appropriate forum.

What is necessary is that

they encompass all who are closely involved, including China,
if there is to be a durable peace in

V~

Nam and Indo-China.

. ..

- 18 I do not know whether there are any greater
prospects for progress towards peace i n this approach than
in the countless others wh i ch have been suggested.

I believe,

however, that unless there is the beginni ng of a negotiated
peace, the f i res of war in Viet Nam will blaze ever more
fiercely.

They will spread further and further, leaving

ever wider arcs of a p i teous wreckage.

And if the fires

burn out of control to World War III, what nation will
claim the vi ctory?
claim it?

Indeed, what nation wi l l be left to
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really an officer; you know he's an enllst,cd
man at heart."
His squadron has the task or s>:'pporll ng
the Navy's Atlantic Fleet by moving perBOnnel and supplies to where they're nccdc'<l.
A letter from Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., DN.C .. offered congratulations on "another successful milestone In the history of the Renegar fnml ."
Jack
egnr, left after the ceremony to
get b
to Puerto Rico. The others will leave
T
ny, with the elder Renegar driving to
Jersey with son Ray before flying back
North Carolina.

SENATOR MANSFIELD HONORED AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF MAINE
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on last
Sunday, February 11, 1968, the people of
Maine and the University of Maine were
privileged and proud to welcome the distinguished majority leader and Mrs.
Mansfield as guests for a memorable day.
The occasion was the university's
founders day convocation. The settinga crisp Maine day with blue skies and
newly fallen snow-must have been
somewhat reminiscent of Montana.
Senator MANSFIELD was warmly received by a capacity audience of 3,000
students, faculty, and citizens in the university's fteldhouse. He chose to discuss
our policies in Korea and Vietnam.
As we have come to expect of him, his
message was though tful, constructive,
and responsible. It was received by a
hushed and attentive audience which responded with a standing ovation.
Senator MANSFIELD's speech was a major contribution to the continuing debate
over our policies in Korea and Vietnam.
It is worthy of widespread and thoughtful consideration. For that r eason, Mr.
President, I ask unanimous consent that
it be printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:

VIETNAM
(Speech o! Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, Democrat, or Montana, at the University or
Maine convocation, Orono, Maine, February
11, 1968)

My remarks, today, deal with Viet Na.m_
Before proceeding to them, however, I wish
to refer to the USS Pueblo Incident. When
added to the Vietnamese conftlct, It ls illustrative or the hydra-headed character or
m!l!tary Involvement on the mainland or
Asia. War spreads readily on that continent;
the difficulty lies In curbing It. I would
emphasize, therefore. that wh ile the urgency
1n Viet Nam Is to brln ~ one bloody conflict
to a close, the Imperative In K orea Is to
prevent the opening o! another.
In the latter connection, lt will help to
bear In mind the essentials or the Pueblo
affair. A U.S. vessel-that It was an electronic
ltstener of some sort is not disputed-was in

a p osition off the North Korean coast. What
vital national need prompted the dispatch or
this particular mission or why the vessel
went undefended are not as yet, ful!y known.
All reports available to me In both the
White House and the Foreign Relations Committee, Indicate that the Pueblo was In International waters at the tlrne It was taken.
As or the moment, the Pueblo Is now at
anchor ln Wonsa.n harbor and the 82 surviving crewmen who were aboard--one other
has died-are Interned \n North Korea. That
Ineluctable !act Is In no way altered by a
sense of outrage or lnd!gna tlon.
The crew aboard the Pueblo was carr ying
out a dangerous assignment. The "why" and
the " how" or the mission are moot at thlll

...._____
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point. What mnttcra now IH th~ ohliKntton to
thooe men. In our ru•u:lloi\H to the Pueblo
alTair, lives must not l)eeonw the pawnR or
either pride or pctulaucfl Every e!Tort to
bring abOut their relcnse must be made.
We will alsu do well to b~nr In mind that
the one war In which we nrc engaged on the
Asian mainland bas become n source or Immense grief. Any move which lends Into a
second Vietnamese-type conflict In Korea
w111 compound the grief but hardly serve the
Interests or tbls nation.
In sum, what most matters at tbls point.
It seems to me, Is: (1) return or the 80-0dd
American crewmen al!ve----I repeat, allve---and; (2) prevention or a 'Second war In Korea
on the pattern or VIet Nam which ce>uld the
more readily become World War Ill.
Tbe firm restraint which President Johnson bas exercised from the outset or the
Pueblo affair has set a wise course for this
nation. The question has been raised at the
United Nations Security Council by Ambassador Arthur Goldberg. It has been pursued
at the Panmunjom truce site In discussions
between our represen tat! ves and those or
North Korea. Other channels are also being
tapped which might lead to the release of
the crewmen. In short, the President's polIcy at this time Is to seek a solution by
diplomacy. It Is the cour'SC of prudence and
reason In what Is, at best, a delicate and
dangerous situation. It deserves every support of the nation.
There Is no certainty that the present efforts will bear !rult. Other possibilities, bowever, may also be avallable. I would point
out, !or example, that, I! necessary, the matter should be pressed further at the United
Nations which bas had a definite responsibilIty In Koren for almost two decades It It
comes to that. It may be feasible to seek
Impartial arbitration or mediation or a
presentation or the entire matter to the
World Court. May I say that precedent !or
the latter procedure Is to be round In a
s!mllar dispute two dectldcs ago over the loss
o! two Brltlsb destroyers of! the Albnnlnn
Coast.
Whatever the specific recourse, In my
judgment, the efforts to find a peaceful solution In the Pueblo atl'alr are attuned to
this nation's Interest. What matters In my
judgment Is saving lives, not saving race.
What matters Is the substance not the shadow o! this nation's Interests.
That Is true In Korea; and It Is no less true
In VIet Nam. The nation's Interests In VIet
Nam, In my judgment, lie In bringing the
war to an honorable conclu•lon at the eRrllest
possible moment. The pursuit o! a negotiated solution was right !or this nation before
the rocent coordinated otren.·,lves In the SOuth
VIetnamese cities. It Is right today, whlle
that offensive continues In oertnln areas and
when a second offensive mny be on the verge
o! opening, 1! not In Khe S·mh, somewhere
else In the remote highlands o! central VIet
Nam.
Insofar as I can see, negotiations nrc and
have always been the only rtltlonnl alternative In this situation to an Indefinite U .S.
Involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland. Two years ago I joined four Senate colleagues. Including Senator Edmund Muskle,
my close and trusted friend, the distinguished denn o! the Senate Republicans, Senator George Aiken o! Vermont and the
equally cllstlngulshed Senators !rom Delaware
and Hawall, J. Caleb Boggs and Daniel
Inouye, In a report at conclusion o! a visit to
Southeast Asia. Our principal observation.
then. was that the American position In VIet
Nam bad the character or "pressing against a
military situation which Is, In effect, openended." We added this comment: "How
open is dependent on the extent to
which North VIetNam and Its supporters are
w1111ng and able to meet Increased force by
Increased force." It 1s more apparent now
than It was at the time that the war Is openended. How open may be uncertain-In my

Judgment It Is still wlc:le open-but 1n any
event, trJ da te. the NLF and the North Vletlll\mese hnve been both ab le and willing to
H>cet lncro.l~C d for"c wllll Increased force.
At the beginning or triG(), the United States
already had 180.00 men In Viet Nnm American forces directly tnvulvLd In the war have
since tripled to something !lpproachlng 600.000-wlth over 000.000 on the ground In VIet
Na.m. 40,000 In Thnllnnd 40.000 In the 7th
Fleet In the South China Sen nnd slmllar
back-up forces In Japan, Okinawa, Ounm
and elsewhere. Total American casualties
have gone well past 100.000. Last year's toll of
those k111ed In Rctlon showed a great Increase
In two years, from 1,964 In 1965 to 9,353 In
1967.
This Increase In the American m111tary effort hns been met by Increases In the North
Vletnamese-NLF etl'ort; their cnsunltles, too.
have Increased greatly. The war, In 5hort, has
risen over the past thre<) yen" to ever higher
Intensities or destructlvrne~s. The baste juxtaposition In VIetnam. however hns not been
altered as antlcJpnted. In the spring o! 1065,
the all-consuming objective or the American
effort was to prevent the co11np•e or a government with which we hnd allied ourselves. Almost three years later. <'Ountless thousands
o! lives Inter, and tens or b1111ons or dollars
later, that Is st111 the objective.
One can put whatever Interpretation one
chooses on the recent events In VIet Nam.
To me. however, they suggest that the survlvn.l. or the Saigon polltlcnl s: n>cture, In Its
present !orm. may now be more uncertain.
The pacltlcnflon program appears to have
gone the route o! at least a dO'Zen prior
schemes for "winning the people" by providIng them with security and a stake 1n the
stn>cture. The cities or South VIet Nam
which have heretofore been spared most or
the ravages of the war, nlmost by ta.clt underst:mdlng, have now been drawn Into the
vortex o! Its terrible devastation. I! there Is
an alternative to chaos m what has heretofore been the core o! the government's
strength. It w111 He In yet another costly task
of recon struction and rehnb111tat1on which
can hardly be borne by the South VIetnamese government.
Whtlt Is now clear Is that no part or South
VIet Nn.m Is secure !or anyone. Tbe hamlets,
v111ages. and the cl ties or VIet Nam are seen
to be honeycombed with a NLF Infrastructure which has undoubtedly exlst.ed for mnny
yenrs, which Is still Intact nnd which may
well be stronger th:m ever.
It Is possible to point to one-sided cnsunlty
figures and to echo one-sided words of reassurance. I! we are Interested In snvlng Hves
rather thnn saving !nee. however, I think we
w111 find the realism to confront the lmpllcntlons or the present sltuo.tlon. The Saigon
po11 tical structure Is no stronger tOday than
It was three years ago In the sense o! b«'lng
able on Its own to govern. to defend or to
rally the people of South VIet Nnm. Indeed,
Its very survival now appears more dependent upon American m111tary power than at
any time In the past. In short, once agnln
there Is not the beginnings o! a beginning o!
a stable polltlcal sltuallon in South Viet
Nam.
Thnt such Is the case. In no way refiects
on the courage or the competence or the
mllltary forces which hnve carried the burden or combat In VIetNam !or many months.
In statistical terms, these forces have been
Immensely effective. They hnve won major
engagement after engngt'ment. The figures
say that over 87,000 enemy troops were k111ed
last year, that another 27.000 have crossed
over to the government side and that countless thousands were captured or were otherwise put out of action. Navnl and ai r power
have pounded so much o! North VIet Nam
Into rubble that there are left unscathed
scarcely nny m111tary or Industrial targets.
Nevertheless, !or the kind or wnr which Is
being fought In South VIet Na.m, the forces
1n opposltlon continue to obtain adequate
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and, apparently, ever more sophisticated milItary supplles over the lnfi.Jtratlon routes
!rom the North. Tbe NLF remains omnipres ent. from the demUltnrl~ed zone at the 17th
parallel to the Mekong Delta and Its regular
forces and guerrillas are steeled to accept
great privation and to make enormous sacrifices. The VIet Cong remain entrenched and
virtually untouched In their tradl tiona!
strongholds--the swamps, paddy-fields and
hamlets or the Mekong Delta-from whence
they are now seen to be able to dlspntch
forces to Snlgon and other cities. North VIet
Nam has committed to the war In the South
considerably less than a quarter or the welltrained rorces o! General Glap. And beyond
North VIet Nam lles the untapped manpower
o! China and the supply HOUrces o! both
Chinn and the Soviet Union.
These a re some of the rea11 ties which the
computers or "progress" In this war do not
measure. These nre some o! the realltles
which urge us to recall the original purposes
for which the nation was committed to South
VIet Nam. They were, above all , llmlted purposes. We went Into VIet Nam not to take
over a war but on the assumption that we
were summoned to aid the people o! South
VIet Nnm.
From the outset, It was not an American
responslblllty and It Is not now an American respons1b111ty to win a victory for any
particular VIetnamese group, or to defeat any
particular VIetnamese group. It was not then
nnd It Is not now an Amerlcnn function to
Insure that any pol1tlcal structure shall be
enshrined over the smoldering ruins o! a
devastated VIet Nam. Even 1! we could, we
should not seek to synthesize a government
or system !or South VIet Nam. That Is not
the responslblllty of the American mllltary
command, the American economists and the
Amerlcnn po11t1cal scientists who are
gathered In Saigon or elsewhere. That Is a
respons1b111ty which can only be exercised
by the VIetnamese people themselves. Tbe
sooner that the 11m1ts or our commitment
nre recognl?.ed by all directly concerned,
therefore, th e better ror all concerned.
We need to face the probablllty, bluntly,
that the bulld-up or the American Involvement, In Its very Immensity. may well have
already extended the role or this nation beyond those llmlts. In so doing, It may not
be nldlng-as It was Intended-to resolve the
situation In accord with the wtsbes of the
people o! SOuth VIet Nn.m. It Is apparent.
for example, that the more that U.S. forces
have taken the major combat role, the
slncker have been the efforts or the al11ed
Indigenous forces. It Is apparent, too, that
n massive U.S. technological presence In
SOuth VIet Nam has exerted a revolutionary
Impact on the whole or the !nbrlc o! trndltlonal VIetnamese society.
In a physical sense. the crushing weight nf
modern warfare has fallen not only on the
Vlt't Cong-the NLF-and the North VIetnamese but on all VIetnamese. The tehlble
cost In 11ves nnd property throughout VIet
Nam 1s borne by VIetnamese o! nil polltlca l
colors.
Our Immense effort, In short. has gone a
long way In altering the character or what
was once an Inner struggle among VIetnamese. In the end, however, the future or
VIet Nam must depend on the VIetnamese
themselves. It Is their country; they llve
In lt. They w111 be Jiving In It long after we
are gone from 1t.
Our commitment Is to support, not to submerge. To strip the VIetnamese struggle o!
Its VIetnamese character. to convert It Into
n war to be won or lost by this nation, detracts from Its relevance both to the people
or VIetNam and to the people of the United
States. To do so Is to consolldnte an American Involvement on the SOutheast Asian
mainland o! Indefinite duration ahd obscure
purpose whose terminus Is not visible---not In
VIet Nam, not In Lnos, or In Cambodia. In-
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deed, It may well be a n Involvement which Is
without exit except In World War III.
This nation Is deeply committed In South
VIet Nam but let us not make the mistake
or Interpret ing that commitment as compelling us--In the name of victory or whatever-to see to It that every last member of
the NLF Is either dulled. dead, or fleeing to
t he North, and t h at North VIetNam has been
bombed back Into the Stone Age. That course
leads not to an ending but to an endless succession of violent beginnings. An Interminable Involvement of American forces may
meet the desires of some In VIet Nam or of
some other nation, but that course does not
accord with the substance of the Interests of
the United States.
President Johnson has repeatedly stated
that this nation's objective Is " . . . only that
the people of south Viet Nam be allowed to
gulde their own country In their own way."
He has stated that he Is willing to move at
any time In negotiations which might bring
about that result.
It should be made clear to all concernedAmertcans and VIetnamese--that that Is the
extent of this nation's commitment. The
commitment Is to all of the people of South
VIet Nam. We have no obligation to continue
to pour out the blood and resources of this
nation until South VIet Nam Is made safe
for one faction or another.
Indeed, In my judgment, there Is little
prospect of meeting our actual commitment
to the people or VIet Nnm In the visible
future unless there Is a prompt restoration
of peace. On that basis, every avenueIn the United Nations or elsewher~hould
continue to be explored In an effort to reach
an honorable conclusion. In so doing, this
nation needs no sanction or approval from
any group, leader, or whomever In VIet Nam
or anywhere else.
In the hope of bringing about a peaceful
settlement without adding to the burdens
of the American forces In the south, I have
joined Senator John Sherman Cooper, a
distinguished colle3€ue with whom I served
In the U.N., & a former Ambassador to India
and others In urging that the bombing of
North VIet Nam be restricted to the Infiltration routes at the 17th parallel. I am
frank to say, however that while It may well
result In negotiations, I am not at all sure
that a cessation of the bombing Is the
c~ltlcal factor In bringing this war to an
honorable conclusion. More Important, In
my ]\ldgment, Is the framework In which
the war In VIet Nam Is seen and within
which Its conclusion Is negotiated. It Is
doubtful that there Is a basis for fruitful
negotiations 11 the conflict Is defined as a
simple case of aggression on the part of the
North against the South. The reality Is tar
more complex, far more subtle. That Is true
Insofar as the relationship between North
and South VIet Nam Is concerned. It Is true
Insofar as the relationship of the various
groups and elements within South VIetNam
Is concerned. The government In Saigon,
as It Is presently constituted continues to
be run by a faction of military officersIndeed, most or whom are northerners--and
they are by no means the whole political
coin. There are other groups of southern
VIetnamese, the Cao Dal, Hoa Hoa, Buddhists, Dal VIet, Catholics, Montagnards, &
others who must be taken more Into consideration If there Is to be an end to the
blOOdshed In the foreseeable future. These
groups Include not only those within the
National L:beratlon Front but elements
which are now without significant voice In
either camp.
A negotiated solution, If there Is to be one,
may well Involve preliminary discussions
among the political, religious, and sectarian
groups, as well as the ruling mill tary group,
which are to be round under the Saigon
structure. It there can be some common
agreement among them to seek a settlement

or the war, It Is at lea&t conceivable thnt
there could then be discussions with the
National Liberation Front. Needless to say,
such discussions can hardly take place If the
Saigon government regards even words of
compromlse as treasonable.
If the door could be opened t o peace-talks
among the South VIetnamese themselves. one
would hope that It would make easier the
opening of doors to negotiations between this
nation and North Viet Nam and among all
the nations directly or Indirectly concerned
In the conflict. A b asis might then be laid
for applying the Geneva accords of 1954 and
1962 In determining the future relationship
of the two parts of VIet N<tm and for guaranteeing the neutrallzntlon of VietNam and all
of Indo-China. May I add it does not much
matter whether such discussions are held
under Unl ted Na tlons auspices or In Geneva,
or In some other appropriate forum. What Is
necessary Is that they encompass all who are
closely Involved, Including China, If there Is
to be a durable pence In VIet Nam and IndoChina.
I do not know whether there are any greater prospects for progress towards peace In
this approach than In the countless others
which have been suggested. I believe, however, that unless there Is the beginning of a
negotiated peace, the fires of war In VIetNam
wlll blaze ever more fiercely. They w111 spread
further and further, leaving ever wider arcs
of a piteous wreckage. And if the fires burn
out or control to World War ill, what nation
will claim the victory? Indeed , what nation
will be lett to claim It?

Mr. MUSKIE. It was highly appropriate, Mr. President, that following his
speech, the degree of doctor of laws
should be conferred upon Senator MANSFIELD by the president of the university,
Dr. Edwin Young. As evidence of the
great respect in which the majority leader is held by the people of Maine, and
the pride we take in him as an honorary
alumnus of the university, I ask unanimous consent that the citation read by
Dr. Young be printed in the RECORD at
this point.
There being no objection, the citation
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
CITATION READ TO SENATOR MANSFIELD. UNIVERSITY

OF

MAINE

CONVOCATION,

FEBRU•

ARY 11, 1968, ORONO, MAINE
Born In New York City and raised In Great
Falls, Montana, he became a grammar school
dropout at the age of 14, when he enlisted
In the United States Navy to serve In World
War I. At the close of the war, no doubt
feeling that a variety of experience would be
useful later on, he re-enellsted and served a
one year hitch, but this time In the United
States Anny. This prepared him for the ultimate In military activity, two years "on the
land and on the sea" with the United States
Marine Corps.
Passing up a career In the Air Force, he returned In 1922 to Montana to work In the
mines. Soon his desire for more knowledge
and wider horizons led him to take a qualifications examination to enter college. After
a start In the Montana School of Mines, he
went on to the B .A. and M .A. Degrees at
Montana State University. Meanwhile, his
Interest In peoples beyond our borders had
become deep and strong. After further studies
at UCLA he was for 10 years a professor
of Latin American and Far Eastern History at
Montana State and Is still professor of History on a pennanent tenure at the University
of Montana.
While still a college teacher he was elected
to Congress In 1942 and served 5 terms In the
House of Representatives. He Is now In his
third term In the Senate. His unusual quailties brought him the post of Assistant Majority Leader even In his first term. In 1961
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he became Majority Leader of the Senate. a
position he still holds. He Is an Influential
member of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. Few men In politics are so well
qualified for this work. In the past 16 years,
under 4 Presidents, he has served his country
with exceptional distinction, especially In
foreign affairs as related to Europe and his
long-term Interests-Latin America and
Southeast Asia.
In recognition or your distinctly American
rise from modest beginnings, of your exercise
or statesmanlike qualities over a quarter century or public service, and or your wide reputation for lntegrtty, forthrightness, and
steadiness In a trying profession In trying
times, the Trustees of the University of
Maine are pleased and proud to confer upon
you the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws;
and by virtue or authority granted to me by
the Board of Trustees, I declare that to
Michael Joseph Mansfield belong all the
rights and honors of the degree which has
been granted and that his name shall forev.er be borne on the rolls of the University
of Maine.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President. I ask
unanimous consent to have printed -in
the RECORD an editorial published in the
Bangor Daily News of February 14, 1968.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
LET US HAVE MORE FaONT-RANK VISITORS
We congratulate the University of Maine,
assisted by Senator Edmund S. Muskle, for
bringing to the Orono campus last Sunday
such a distinguished visitor as Senator Mike
Mansfield of Montana, Democratic chieftain
In the Senate.
As honor guest at the Founders Day Convocation, Mansfield gave an Interesting talk
and news Interview. His words provided copy
for the news media of the nation, bearing
the dateline of Orono, Me. He talked very
frankly about such controversial matters as
the VIetnam war and the proposed travel tax.
It was a stimulating day.
We hope It w111 spur efforts to bring other
prominent lenders Into the state from time to
time. Maine Is small In terms of population
and not very Influential In national affairs.
But Its citizens and educational Institutions
are first class, and rate a fair share of attention by front-ranking national leaders. This
was recognized, by the way, by no less a person than the late President John F. Kennedy, whose visit to Orono In 1963 was a
most memorable event.
Let's think big when seeking distinguished
guests for college commencement exercises
and other Important occasions relating to affairs within the state.
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